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Abstract: Important inflation differences have been existing since 1978 across the Chinese
provinces. This paper intends to connect this observation with the literature that emphasises
the role of local governments in the process of excess credit supply in China. A model is
proposed, which presents the credit growth as an outcome of the macroeconomic power
enjoyed by local authorities. The higher the degree of macroeconomic autonomy of the
province, the higher its inflation rate through a higher credit expansion. The proposition is
supported by a panel-data analysis applied to the Chinese provinces
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INTRODUCTION
Studying inflation differences within China may appear groundless as the convergence in
inflation rates is supposed to emerge as an outcome of taking part to a monetary union.
Nevertheless, the Chinese provinces exhibit important inflation differences, as shown by
Figure 1.











































































































































































































Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (various years)
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The existence of important inflation differentials across the Chinese provinces is much less
surprising once their degree of economic integration is taken into account. Indeed, markets for
both goods and capital show signs of regional fragmentation in China. According to the
World Bank (1994), inter-provincial investment as a share of total investment is quite low and
has declined between 1985 and 1992, while the share of external investment has increased. By
instance, in 1992 inter-provincial and foreign investment accounted for respectively 3.3% and
31.7% of total investment in  Guangdong. Similarly, the share of trade flows across the
provinces, relative to total retail trade, has declined in many provinces, while the share of
external trade has increased. Between 1985 and 1992, domestic interprovincial trade grew at a
rate of 4.8% per year, much lower than foreign trade and total retail sales (9%)
1. This suggests
to the authors that “individual provinces are tending to behave like independent countries”.
Hence, inflation differentials between the Chinese provinces can at least partly be explained
by the factors usually used in the literature on cross-country inflation differences. According
to this literature, inflation differences are initiated by different macroeconomic policies
2.
In this paper, we intend to show how the implementation of different policies at the local level
has generated differences in provincial inflation rates in China. Particularly, it will be argued
that the inflationary impact of local policy depends on the degree of local macroeconomic
autonomy, which has been varying over time and across the provinces. The paper is organised
as follows: in section 1, a stylised description presents the way local policy generates
excessive credit growth. We develop in turn a model of the transmission channel between
local macroeconomic autonomy, credit growth and inflation (section 2). In the third and last
section, we test for the theoretical implications.
1. STYLISED DESCRIPTION
Since 1978, the Chinese transition has been characterised by the economic overheating e.g.
the simultaneity of decentralisation, inflation, and strong real growth. Basically, reforms have
been aimed to grant local agents more management autonomy. Decentralisation provides to
local agents the necessary incentives to grow richer. It is therefore a prerequisite for a strong
                                                
1 Overseas exports and imports grew at 17 and 7% per year respectively over the same period.3
economic growth. Particularly, the reforms in fiscal and investment management have deeply
modified the relation between local and central authorities. First, it has allowed the local
authorities to reveal their own policy preferences. Second, increasing investment management
responsibilities have provided local authorities the means to achieve their own policy targets.
1.1. Local policy objectives
Before the reforms, economic resources were forwarded to the state-owned industrial
enterprises and in turn to the central government while local government expenditures were
closely monitored. Bank credit could only be used for circulating investment, while capital
investments were financed straight through budgetary subventions.
Starting in 1985, state enterprises were granted greater autonomy. They were allowed to keep
part of their profit, and to rely on bank credit for their capital investment. Conversely, central
revenue has shrunk. As a consequence, state investment management has been more and more
transferred to the localities. The local investment share in total state fixed investment jumped
from 27% in 1975 to 65% in 1995, which corresponds for the same year to 21% of the total
fixed investment
3.
This transfer of investment responsibility has been made possible because at the same time
local governments had been granted more financial autonomy through the fiscal reforms
implemented from the beginning of the eighties. Local governments came to collect, own and
spend about 70% of budgetary revenue, that is to say 9% of GDP at the beginning of the
nineties (Zhang, 1999). Moreover, the  extrabudgetary funds available to the local
governments have been increasing rapidly: in 1995, they accounted for one third of total local
revenue.
The basic scheme of the fiscal reforms was to divide the central and local revenues by
enterprise according to their administrative subordinate relationship, e.g. respectively between
large state-owned enterprises, and “local” enterprises. Local governments have thus been
allowed to benefit by the development of the enterprises they were responsible for. In order to
maximise their own resources, local governments had strong incentives to allocate the
available financial resources in the most dynamic sectors associated with the highest profits.
                                                                                                                                            
2 See Campillo and Miron (1996), Cottarelli et al. (1998) for a survey of the literature.
3 If the project is supervised by a central government agency, then it is classified as a central project. Otherwise,
it is classified as local. “Supervision” means that the appropriate authority formulates the project proposal, seeks
or issues its approval, and is responsible for the project financing.4
This allocation could take the form of investment in pre-existing local enterprises or the
creation of new enterprises under local authority. In other words, local authorities had full
incentive to maximise the real growth in their province.
1.2. Local policy instruments
Local state investment represents the main instrument for local authorities to achieve their
policy objectives. Local investment is thus directed towards the most dynamic sectors in order
to maximise the province development (light and textile industries, construction industries,
and commerce). Sectors typically associated with strong externalities (infrastructure, energy,
raw materials) remain under the central government responsibility
4.
To finance their investment and growth policy, local governments have been heavily relying
on bank credit, leading to excessive credit growth
5. Officially, banking activities are defined
by the credit plan, and reviewed by the branch of the central bank present at the local level.
The banking sector is state-dominated, with the four state banks accounting for 70% of the
banking sector in 1997. However, because both local officials of the central bank and the state
banks depend on local governments for material and financial benefits as well as social
facilities, they have strong incentives to follow local government priorities
6.
The process of excessive credit growth has been well described in the literature
7: taken as a
whole, the credit overspending is an outcome of the central government dual-objective, e.g.
the compliance with the credit ceilings and the financing of strategic projects or enterprises.
With the support of local banks, provincial governments purposely divert the available
resources from central to local projects or enterprises, because they anticipate that the central
authorities will ultimately provide the financing gap. In other words, the locally initiated
credit overspending emerges as a result of the lack of credibility of the central credit policy.
Hence, local authorities are able to influence the local credit policy to finance their investment
policy
8. This influence can take the form of a direct financing of the local budget to cover the
local government expenditures or can be more indirect by asking the bank to finance a
specific project or to extend a loan to an enterprise under the local responsibility.
                                                
4 Local officials influence the allocation of central investment only at the margin. It basically depends on central
priorities.
5 Bank credit accounts for 25% of total investment financing during the transition period
6 See Ma (1995), Qian and Xu (1993).
7 See among other Brandt and Zhu (1998), Jin (1994), Ma (1995), Wang (1991).
8 For instance, Liew (1994) assumes that the monetary power is decentralised at the provincial level.5
Local government influence on the provincial credit growth may however vary according to
the existing balance between local and central policies in each of the provinces. Since state
investment represents the main instrument for local authorities to achieve their policy
objective, the share of state investment locally controlled provides a good idea of the degree
of local government autonomy. Large differences can be found between the provinces: by
instance in 1995, 81% of the state investment in the Fujian province were managed by the
local government, compared to only 35% in the  Xinjiang autonomous region. Hence,
provincial governments do not benefit from the same latitude to implement their policies. This
suggests in turn that their influence on the total credit growth in the province varies according
to their degree of policy autonomy.
In brief, because of the existing collusion between provincial governments and banks, local
authorities are able to divert resources to maximise the growth inside the border of their
provinces, which in turn maximise their revenues. This results in excessive credit growth,
because of the central commitment to finance the central priority projects. This process does
not however provide any mechanism that explains inflation stabilisation. The next section
explains inflation reduction as a result of “austerity” policies implemented by the central
authorities.
1.3. The Political Centralisation as an Instrument of Inflation Control
The corollary of the local government preference for growth is their little aversion to inflation.
The increase in production capacity, in the number of staff workers and/or wages are seen as
signals for local dynamism. By contrast, inflation is perceived as a national process which
central authorities are responsible for. Since it embodies the political power, the central
government has to cope with the social discontent generated by inflation. As Huang (1996)
writes: “If they do not balance the macroeconomic situation, no one else in the system will.
They are “balancers of last resort”. Moreover, since inflation is associated with the diversion
of the resources initially devoted to central priority projects, the central authorities have full
incentive to reassert their control on the economy when inflation surges.
The central authority has little power to enforce the implementation of the policy defined by
the credit and investment plans. Moreover, the centre suffers from an information asymmetry6
problem. Along with the decentralisation and the market reforms, signals of local shirking
behaviour have become blurred. As underlined by Jin (1994), the centre is unable to
distinguish the performance of their local subordinates in the implementation of policies.
However, a rise in national inflation is a signal for economic overheating. The central
government then relies on political leverage to enforce the implementation of an austerity
program. Indeed, if most of the economic power has been decentralised in China, the political
power has remained centralised. As writes Huang (1996): “No matter how strong local
officials in economic terms, they remain, as during the Maoist period, bureaucratic and
political subordinates”. Conformity to the Chinese Communist Party ideology is a necessary
condition for advancement. Therefore, when deciding stabilisation, the centre also emphasises
administrative and ideological discipline to enforce local officials to follow the central
recommendations.
In practice, austerity policies are conducted through administrative and economic means. On
one hand, investment growth is slowed down by reducing the available credit and by
centralising the approval procedure. On the other hand, the investment structure is modified.
Typically resources that were diverted from central to local project are shifted back to central
priority investment projects, as shown in Figure 2 by the changes in the ratio of local to
central state investment.

































































































































































































Source: China Statistical Yearbooks (various years)
More precisely, the inflationary process shown by Figure 2 can be described as follows: an
increase in the share of local investment is followed by an increase in real growth and7
inflation, as a consequence of local investment policy. Subsequently, local officials are asked
by the centre to slow down investment growth and to substitute central for local investment,
which corresponds to a decrease in the ratio of local to central investment after each inflation
pick. The associated cost of austerity is the slowing down of real growth. Thus, once inflation
is under control, central authorities soften the credit constraints to renew with economic
expansion. A new growth/inflation cycle begins.
In the following section, a model of the transmission mechanism between local policy and
inflation illustrates the above description.
2. MODELLING THE SHARING OF MACROECONOMIC POWER
The model developed here is transposed from Cukierman (1995)’s analysis on the inflationary
outcome of central bank independence, which relies on traditional model of monetary policy
time-inconsistency: the policymaker objective is to reach a desired level of employment while
minimising inflation. Due to the existence of long-term contracts or because of a Lucas type
confusion between aggregate nominal and real relative shocks, the deviation of employment
from its natural level is positively related to unanticipated inflation. The policymakers choose
the monetary growth rate such as to maximise their objective function, and given the expected
inflation rate. The first order condition provides the result of interest: the rate of monetary
growth and inflation depend positively on the concern of policymakers for employment
relative to inflation.
Central bank independence can thus be seen as an institutional device to solve the inflationary
bias of monetary policy: under the central assumption that central banks care relatively more
than political authorities about price stability, the delegation of the monetary power to the
central bank implies a lower preference for employment relative to inflation control. The main
result is that a lower level of central bank independence is associated with more inflation
variability and a higher level of inflation.
China experience requires several modifications of the base model. The concept of central
bank independence is not relevant in China. On one hand, since the People’s Bank of China is
officially subjected to the central government policies. The central bank and the central
government are thus taken as one single agent: the central authority. One the other hand, since
local banks have strong incentives to follow local government priorities rather than the head8
office instructions, the local government and the central bank local branch are also considered
as one single agent: the local authority.
We assume that local and central authorities have a similar trade-off between inflation control
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The local and central objective functions are identical, except that their respective concern for
growth relative to inflation  Ac,i and  Aloc,i are allowed to differ. As explained in the first
section, the local authorities put more emphasise on growth maximisation while the central
authority cares about price stability. We model this divergence of policy preferences by the
following inequality: Ac,i < Aloc,i.
Using the credit growth as instrument, both the central and the local authorities design the
macroeconomic policy in the province i, depending on the sharing of macroeconomic power.
Let  di be a parameter between zero and one, measuring the degree of macroeconomic
autonomy enjoyed by the local authority. Particularly we suppose that given  di, the actual
choice of policy can be represented as arising from the maximisation of a weighted average of
the objective functions (1.a) and (1.b) with weights di and 1-di respectively. This intermediate
objective function, featuring the relative influence of local and central authorities on the




















where Ai = (1-di)Ac,i + dAloc,i, 0 < di <1.
Finally, instead of using a Phillips relationship that can be questioned in the Chinese case we
formulate the idea that the credit growth, the real growth and inflation are pro-cyclical in
China, as described in section 2. We use the same production function as Ma (1995): the
output in the province  i  Yi is assumed to be positively related to the credit volume  Li9




a , 0<a<1 (3)
pi = li – yi = (1-a).li (4)
The authorities maximise their objective function (2) with respect to the credit growth  li
under the constraint (4) and given the sharing of macroeconomic power di. The first order





























The credit growth and the inflation rate are both increasing with the growth/inflation trade-off
Ai
10. Since Ac,i < Aloc,i, credit and inflation also depend positively on di, the local autonomy,
leading to the following proposition
 11:
Proposition:  The higher the macroeconomic autonomy of the local
authority di, the higher the growth of credit li, hence the higher the inflation
rate pi in the province i, ceteris paribus.
We turn to the econometric evidence of this proposition.
                                                
9 For simplicity, we abstract here from other determinants of inflation such as changes in the money demand,
deficit financing, or other variables specific to transitional economies. The econometric analysis will control for
these factors.
10 Laffont (1997)’s dynamic model with two regions leads to a similar result. The central bank trade-off between
growth and inflation determines the regional growth. The decentralisation allows regions to benefit by their own
development, but forces them in return to transfer part of their output to the central bank. Because these transfers
increase the central bank preference for growth relative to inflation, decentralising leads to a higher inflation
rate.
11 The signs of the derivative of the credit growth and inflation with respect to a are indeterminate. The signs are
positive (negative) if the marginal productivity of credit is low (high) and the relative preference for real growth
is high (low).10
3. ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE
The panel data set is composed of 24 Chinese provinces over the period 1988-95
12. Since the
inflationary impact of local autonomy is assumed to go through the growth of credit, we
proceed in two steps: first, the provincial credit growth is explained by local autonomy, that is
the positive relationship between the local autonomy and the growth of credit given by
equation (5) is assessed. Second, provincial inflation is expressed as a function of credit
growth, as shown by equation (4). Then the positive relationship between provincial inflation
and local autonomy is finally tested (equation 6 ).
3.1. Equation of Provincial Credit Growth
The dependent variable is the provincial credit growth lit. To measure local autonomy, the
ratio of local to central state investment is used ( dit). As detailed in section 1, local state
investment is an important instrument of local policy. However, during austerity periods,
local authorities are asked by the centre to substitute central for local investment. It will thus
measures the trade-off relationship between central and local. This variable varies over time
and also across the provinces, as shown in section 1. In addition, since the extent to which
local governments rely on bank credit to finance their expenditures is also an indicator of their
autonomy, the local deficit (defit) is introduced
13.
Panel-data econometrics requires taking into account the two-dimensional structure of the
data. Fixed individual effects are introduced to capture provincial structural features. Since
the provinces belong to the same country, the time dimension should not be omitted. The
national trend of credit growth will account for the fact that each province can be affected by
the same nation-wide macroeconomic fluctuation. We compute it as the growth of national
credit excluding the endogenous variable contribution. In other words, if  lit  is the credit
growth of the i
th province at time t and l-it the national trend, the following regression is run:
1  with  .
1
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Where a1,a2, a0, are the parameters to estimate, ui. the fixed individual effect, eit the error, i (t) the provincial
(time) subscript, Lkt the amount of credit in the k
th province at the end of year t.
                                                
12 See appendix 1 for a description of the sample and for the variable definitions.
13 Including budgetary and extra-budgetary items.11
The results are reported in Table 1, regression 1.1. The national trend is highly significant,
which means that a large part of the provincial credit growth rates is explained by the same
macroeconomic developments encountered by all the provinces.
The autonomy variable is associated with a positive and significant coefficient. Hence, the
higher the relative weight of local investment, the higher the credit growth. Moreover,  a
positive correlation is found between inflation and the magnitude of the government deficit,
suggesting the use of credit to finance local government expenditures.  These two results
support the hypothesis of a local influence on credit policy.
Since local investment is partly financed by bank credit, the causality could be bi-directional.
Hausman (1978)’s methodology is used for testing exogeneity of the autonomy variable. It is
basically a test of no misspecification in the model under H0. The coefficient estimate under
OLS is consistent and efficient under H0, but not consistent under H1. The coefficient
estimate under 2SLS is consistent under both H0 and H1, but not efficient under H0
14. The
test statistics (m= 0.0580) is significant at the 10% level. Since we cannot treat the autonomy
variable as exogenous, we retain the model using the Instrumental Variable estimation (1.2.
regression), that exhibits similar estimates.
The model stability over time is investigated using Chow tests: the whole period regression fit
is compared to the model estimate over the first half period. The F-test statistic reported at the
end of Table 1 is not significant at the 5% level. Cross-provincial stability is also evaluated,
cutting the sample into three groups of provinces (coastal, central, and western provinces)
15.
The regression fit over the whole sample is successively compared to a restricted sample
excluding one group. Since the three F-statistics are not significant, the model specification fit
also the cross-dimension of the sample. We thus not reject that the coefficients are stable over
time and across provinces.
The main empirical findings are threefold: first, provincial credit growth strongly depends on
the national macroeconomic environment, but not solely: when local investment, hence local
policy, is dominant the growth of credit is higher. Second, the need for deficit financing
                                                
14 The instruments are the log of GDP per capita, as a proxy of the development level of the province, the
openness ratio as a proxy of the potential for local investment, and the stock of infrastructure in the province, as
a proxy of the need for central investment. They are all one year lagged.
15 Provinces were classified into three regions by the 7
th five-year plan (1986-90). Coastal provinces are the most
developed, with the highest revenue per capita, and the highest real growth, as opposed to Western provinces.
Central provinces stand between.12
increases the credit growth in the provinces, other things being equal. Both results support the
evidence that local governements do exercise a monetary power through their influence on the
credit growth in the province.
3.2 Equation of Provincial inflation
The transmission mechanism between autonomy and inflation is assumed to go through credit
expansion. Provincial inflation is thus expressed as a function of credit growth with a one-
year lag ( li,t-1). In addition, we control for two important factors of inflation, that were
previously omitted for simplicity reasons: first, the variations in money velocity are captured
by the real growth of the household saving deposits (di,t-1). For a given rate of credit growth,
an increase in the household real saving lowers inflation, and inversely
16. Second, the
transitional features of the Chinese provinces are also considered. The empirical literature on
inflation difference across transition countries use indexes of reform progress under the
following assumption: the more advanced a country in its structural reforms, the more
competitive the economy, the better the quality of economic policy, hence the lower the
inflation
17. Following these studies, the ratio of non-state to state production (Ti,t-1) will
account for the differences in the quality of transition among the Chinese provinces.
Finally, the national trend of inflation (p-i,t) is introduced to capture time-specific effects.
Again, it is computed as a weighted average of the inflation rates of all provinces except the
endogenous variable. Fixed provincial effects enter all regressions.
To summarise, if pit is the credit growth of the i
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Where a’1, a’2, a’3, a’0 are the parameters to estimate, u’i the fixed individual effect, e’it the error, i (t) the
provincial (time) subscript, Yk the real GDP of the province k.
                                                
16 Saving deposits are almost the only financial asset that the Chinese households are allowed to use.
17 Cotarelli et al (1998) use several indexes, as the private sector share of GDP, progress in privatisation and
enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, foreign trade liberalisation, financial market liberalisation, and legal
reforms. However, only the degree of price liberalisation and the progress made in bank restructuring appear to
lower significantly inflation. Fisher et al (1998), and Lougani et Sheets (1997) both use the index constructed by
De Melo at al (1996) that assesses each country’s overall reform program, taking into account the extent of
liberalisation of prices and state trading monopolies, liberalisation of foreign trade, privatisation of enterprises
and banking reform. Both of them find a strongly significant negative correlation between the index and the13
Table 2 reports the results. Again, the national trend has a strong positive impact on inflation
(regression 2.1). Hence, the inflationary processes across the Chinese provinces follow close
cycles
18. The trend of national inflation captures the impact of nation-wide reforms, like price
liberalisation, external trade liberalisation, exchange rate policy, or financial reforms.
Provincial inflation is not only a national process, as shown by the significance of the
provincial specific variables
19. First, the one period lagged growth of credit increases
significantly inflation, while the real growth of household saving deposits decreases it.
Moreover, since the absolute values of their coefficients are not significantly different, the
growth of credit is inflationary only if not matched by an equivalent growth of the household
saving deposits
20. For instance, when inflation surged in 1988, saving deposits were
massively converted into cash, and cash into consumer goods, which further increased
inflation. Finally, the ratio of non-state to state production is associated with a negative
coefficient: it shows that the more advanced the province in the transition process, the less its
inflation rate. The conclusion replicates the empirical results found by the studies of inflation
differential applied to transition economies.
Again, we test for the time and cross-sectional stability of the model. We can not reject the
null hypothesis of coefficient stability, as shown by the Chow statistics reported at the end of
Table 2.
The positive effect on inflation of the credit growth does not lead however to any conclusion
relative to role of local autonomy. The positive effect can be due to the residual credit growth
from regression (1.2.). To assess the role of local autonomy on inflation, the credit growth is
replaced by its fitted value and the residuals from regression (1.2.). The results are reported in
regression (2.2.). While the residuals are not significant, the fitted value increases inflation
only at the 13% level. This low confidence level could be due to the presence in the fitted
value of the national trend of credit growth. Indeed, the inflationary impact of the national
credit growth is already reflected by the national trend of inflation. We thus introduce
separately on one hand the credit growth value explained by the local autonomy and the fiscal
                                                                                                                                            
inflation rate.
18  Zhao and Tong (1996) come to the same conclusion in their statistical analysis of inflation dispersion.
Unfortunately, data on goods and capital flows across the provinces are not available to go deeper into the
question.
19 The F-test of the joint significance of the province specific variables (d, T, and l) leads to the rejection of the
restriction (F(3,166)=5.59, with a P-value of 0.1%). We thus retain the model with all the right-hand side
variables.
20 The Wald test leads to a F-stat of 0.37 associated with a probability of 55%.14
deficit and on the other hand the national trend of credit. The positive impact of the fitted
value becomes significant, while the national trend of credit growth is not, which supports our
intuition (regression 2.3.). The credit growth is also replaced by its determinants to evaluate
their total effect on inflation (regression 2.4.). Only the autonomy variable is found to have a
significant impact on provincial inflation. On average, around 20% of the provincial inflation
rates are explained by this variable
21.
3.3 Alternative variable
Finally, we pay particular attention to the Brandt and Zhu (1999) empirical study of
the inflation cycles in China. These authors explain the cycles by the central support to the
state sector. Because of the soft budget constraint of the state firms, the productivity level in
the state sector is lower than in the non-state sector. This leads to an increase in the allocation
of credit to the non-state sector, and in turn to a widening income gap between the state and
the non-state sector. The central government is committed to equalise the income in the state
and the non-state sector but can not perfectly control the allocation of credit. Hence, it has to
resort on seigniorage to finance the transfer to the state sector. Therefore, an increase in the
allocation of credit to the non-state sector results in more rapid growth, but also in an increase
in the transfers required to the state sector, that are financed through seigniorage, which
generates inflation.
According to this interpretation, the variable of interest is rather the share of state investment
in total investment than the share of local state investment in total state investment. The less
the resources allocated to the state sector, the more needed the seigniorage, hence the higher
the inflation rate. The authors find a strong negative correlation between the state share of
investment and seigniorage and in turn between seigniorage and inflation. We also introduce
the ratio of non-state to state investment in our panel estimations. Regression (2.5) shows that
while the ratio of local to central investment still increases significantly inflation, the ratio of
non-state to state enterprise investment is insignificant
22. There is thus no evidence that the
                                                
21 The contribution is roughly computed as the average of the ratio of the autonomy variable times its coefficient
to the fitted value of inflation.
22 We also run the regression without the ratio of non-state to state industrial production which can be suspected
to be highly correlated with the ratio of non-state to state investment. The alternative variable was still not
significant.15
result found by Brandt and Zhu (1999) at the national level holds to explain inflation
differences at the local level.
Under the state/non-state interpretation, the state banks extend as much credit as possible to
the more productive non-state sector in order to maximise their own profit
23. Under the
local/central government interpretation, the state banks accommodate the local government
policy and allocate the credit in the most dynamics sectors. Under both hypotheses, the central
government reasserts administrative control over credit and investment in the economy to
control inflation. Remembering that the state-owned investment used by Brandt and Zhu
includes the state investment controlled by the local governments allows reconciling both
interpretations of the inflation process in China. Under financial decentralisation, credit funds
are diverted both from the central government investment projects to the state enterprises
controlled by the local governments and from the state to the non-state sector. If the intention
is to study the credit diversion, a better indicator will then be the share of the central
investment share in the total amount of fixed investment. According to our intention of
analysing the sharing of the macroeconomic power between local and central governments
and its inflationary consequences, the ratio of local to central state investment remains
however a good indicator of the relative autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
CONCLUSION
Inflation differences across the Chinese provinces can partly be explained by the policy
implemented by the local governments in their provinces. A simple model shows how a
higher credit growth emerges from a higher degree of local macroeconomic autonomy. The
econometric analysis supports the proposition. The contribution of provincial macroeconomic
autonomy to credit growth creates additional inflation. In other words, local governments do
exercise a monetary power that varies through time and across provinces. Because they
emphasise more real growth than inflation control, this monetary power leads to inflation.
We control for other additional determinants of inflation: particularly, the time and cross
dimensions of the sample are taken into account by the inclusion of fixed provincial effects
                                                
23 The assumption of profit maximisation by the state banks is questionable, since they face soft budget
constraints as the state enterprises (see Qian (1994).16
and the national trends of the endogenous variables. Moreover, we also account for the
differences in the saving behaviour of households, showing that credit growth is inflationary
only if not matched by an equivalent growth of saving deposits. The negative impact of the
ratio of non-state to state production reproduces earlier results on transitional countries: the
more advanced the province in the reform process, the less its inflation rate.
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on the relation between local and central
authorities by providing evidence of the inflationary consequence of local policies. This does
not mean however that decentralisation in China has gone too far. We rather interpret the
results as the need for institutional reforms that restrain the local influence on credit policy.
From a policy perspective, the Chinese authorities face a dilemma: on one hand, only re-
centralising the macroeconomic power allows to control inflation. On the other hand, only
decentralisation provides enough incentives at the local level to promote economic growth.
The recent reform of the People’s Bank of China is an attempt to solve this dilemma by
reducing the number of branches of the central bank present at the local level.17
APPENDIX 1: SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
Sample:
The sample is composed of 24 Chinese provinces, municipalities directly under the central
government and autonomous regions:
Coastal provinces:  Tianjing, Shanghai,  Hebei,  Liaoning,  Jiangsu,
Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan.
Central provinces:  Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Inner Mongolia.
Western provinces:  Sichuan,  Guizhou,  Yunnan,  Shaanxi,  Gansu,
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang.
Due to data availability, Beijing, Guangxi, Hubei, Shandong are excluded from the sample.
Hainan and Guangdong provinces are aggregated.
Database sources:
China Regional Economy, a profile of 17 years of reform and opening-up, China State
Statistical Bureau, 1996, China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical Bureau, various years,
Almanac of China foreign economic relations and trade, China Statistical Bureau, various
years, Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, China Statistical Bureau, various years,
Variable specification:
￿  Inflation: rate of growth of overall consumer price index of residents.
￿  Credit growth: rate of growth of credit in the state owned banks, including loans to
state-owned enterprises, urban collective enterprises, industrial and commercial loans to
households, agricultural loans, and fixed asset loans.
￿  Real growth of household saving deposits: growth of real saving deposits hold by
households (1978 retail price index) in the state owned banks.
￿  Non-state/state industrial production: Non-state real industrial production / state real
industrial production.
￿  Autonomy: ratio of local to central state investment.
￿  Government deficit: (budgetary and extra-budgetary expenditures - budgetary and
extra-budgetary revenue) deflated by the retail price index (1978 prices) / real GDP (1978
prices)
￿  Infrastructure: (railway length + road length)/surface area of the province
￿  Real GDP per capita: self-explanatory.
￿  Openness: (exports + imports)/ GDP. Exports and imports with respect to the rest of
the world are converted at official exchange rate into local currency (RMB yuans).18
APPENDIX 2: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Table 1: Credit Growth Regressions
Dependent variable: growth of credit (li,t) 1.1. 1.2
1
Growth of credit (national) (l-i,t) 0.886 0.886
(6.06)** (5.93)**
Government deficit (tdefi,t) 0.456 0.419
(3.10)** (2.52)**
Autonomy (di,t) 0.021 0.026
(2.93)** (2.07)**
R2 0.25 0.35
* (**): significant at the 10% (5%) level. Number of observations: 178
1Instrumental variable estimation.
All regressions include individual fixed effects.
Chow tests:  Time dimension: F(86,64) =1.11 (breakpoint: 1991);
Cross-dimension: F(55,95)=0.71 (Coast), F(49,101)=0.56 (Centre), F(53,97)=0.86 (West).
Table 2: Provincial Inflation Regressions
Dependent variable: inflation rate (pi,t) 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5.
Inflation rate (national) (p-i,t) 0.877 0.867 0.865 0.862 0.863
(31.54)** (28.30)** (28.44)** (27.93)** (27.91)**
Non-state/state industrial production (Ti,t-1) -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(-1.71)* (-1.88)* (-2.20)** (-2.21)** (-2.37)**
Real growth of deposits  (di,t-1) -0.076 -0.083 -0.075 -0.073 -0.071
(-4.03)** (-3.96)** (-3.56)** (-3.30)** (-3.22)**
Growth of credit (li,t-1) 0.083
(1.75)*
Fitted value of regression (1.2) 0.151 0.293
1
(1.52) (2.37)**
Residual of regression (1.2) 0.071 0.076 0.074 0.079
(1.42) (1.54) (1.50) (1.59)
Growth of credit (national) (l-i,t-1) 0.002 -0.011 0.001
(0.021) (-0.10) (0.01)
Government deficit (tdefi,t-1) 0.083 0.071
(1.02) (0.87)
Autonomy (di,t-1) 0.010 0.011
(1.97)** (2.08)**
Non-state/state investment (t-1) 0.013
(0.87)
R2 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87
* (**): significant at the 10% (5%) level. Number of observations: 194.
All regressions include individual fixed effects.
1 excluding the national credit growth impact (=0.02* autonomy(t-1) + 0.41 * government deficit (t-1))
Chow Tests:  Time dimension: F(111, 79) = 0.59 (breakpoint: 1991);
Cross dimension: F(87,128)=0.78 (Coast),F(63,152)= 0.97(Centre), F(69,146)=0.26 (West).19
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